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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DORA H. STEVENS, CONNIE JOY
LEIGHT, JACK HOLT STEVENS
and ALICE DAYLE ESPLIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
COLORADO FUEL & IRON, a oorporation, for rwhom UNITED STA TES
STEEL CORPORATION has been
substituted, and EMPLOYERS MUTUAL OF WAUSAU, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Before answering any arguments made by the Appellanrts to support their claim, the Respondent United States
Steel Corporation invites the Court's attention to the fact
that this appeal is taken from a memorandum decision
rendered by Judge Nelson Day of the District; Court of Iron
County, State of Utah, dismissing the action for the reason
that the Complaint as amended did not state a cause of
action. Appellants' principal thrust against the holding in
the memorandum is on the grounds that the Trial Court
failed "to grasp the situation that the Plaintiffs are faced
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with". If the Trial Judge did fail in that rega1·d, which we
doubt, the situation he faced was the difficult task of interpreting the allegations of a Complaint which is not a
model of clarity. Its style of structure is such that immaterial, irrelevant and confusing subjects are blended with
redundant facts in such a manner that Counsel for Respondent find themselveB in the same situation as the Trial
Judge.
As amended, the Complaint remotely suggests two
possible legal theories for recovery : (1) That Utah Construction, decedent's employer ,and hereafter referred to as
"Utah", was an agent of Respondent, and as principal is
chargeable with Utah's negligence; and (2) that because
Respondent had some inter&St in ore stocked by Utah on
Utah's own land, Respondent had a duty continuously to
inspect Utah's operations, and if they resul,ted in creating
unsafe conditions on Utah's Low Grade Dump #8, then
Respondent had a duty to have them rendered safe.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Respondent is the owner of certain mining claims located in the Lindsay HiH Mine area, Iron Springs Mining
District, Township 35, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, known and designated as the Little Allie and
Cora Groups. Utah is the owner of numerous other mining
claims in the same District and it uses some of them for
the purpose of dumping and storing low-grade ore. Of
particular importance to this decision is that Low Grade
Dump #8, the place of the accident, is located on lands

•Jwned by Utah and not the Respondent. (A map for illustrati,·e purposes will be used at the arguments.)
The Amended Complaint correctly alleges that decedent
was an employee of Utah and that he had been employed
that Corporation for a substantial period of time. He
was familiar with the area. On the particular day of the
t1·agedy, he was performing his duties as a driver of a large
dump truck. The method of operation used by Utah in
handling ore in the area involved was to dig the ore from
mining claims of Respondent, claims owned by other companies and from its own property. After the ore was
severed from the ground, it would be loaded on one of
Utah's trucks and from there, the vehicle would be driven
to one of a number of low-grade dumps, which was designated by Utah, and then dumped. The mining, loading,
hauling and dumping were by personnel employed by and
under the exclusive control and direction of Utah, and the
land upon Which the ore was placed was owned by it. There
are no a verments that the Respondent had any right, title
or interest in or to the land upon which the dumps were
located.
The Amended Complaint contains some conclusions to
the effect that the contract placed responsibility for mining, moving, stockpiling and shipping on Respondent, but
fails to aver any fact which shows that the Respondent had
any duty to control, supervise and direct the operation.
Apart from the conclusions of the Amended Complaint that
its practical effect is otherwise, the language of the document as alleged cannot be tortured to mean anything other
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than that Respondent's only obligation was to pay Utah
for the ore after its value had been determined.
Utah Construction and Mining Company is a 1,arge
company with qualified employees in charge of its mining
operations. It was unfett€red in its control and method
of extracting, hauling and piling of ore in the Iron Springs
Mining District. There is no averment in the Amended
Complaint which charges Respondent with kn-owledge that
Utah was not qualified to perform mining operations in a
careful and proper manner, or that Respondent was careless in selecting Utah as an independent contractor.
According to the Complaint as amended, a few days
before the accident Utah had undercut Low Grade Dump
#8, and by virtue of this undercutting, the dump was left
in a dangerous condition. Furthermore, it is alleged that
the Respondent knew, or should have known, that during
the few days of this undercutting, Utah had weakened the
east end of the dump and thus made the unloading of trucks
on that portion of the stockpile dangerous. Facts are not
stated which support that naked conclusion. The following
allegations seem to be pertinent as to Appellant's claim
that Respondent was chargeable with any actual knowledge,
other than such as might 1be imputed through UtaJh:
"The Utah Construction and Mining Company
actually did the earth moving and the ore moving
on a contract basis at a stated price per ton, although the instrument under which this was being
done contaJined languag,e of a lease. Said Utah Construction and Mining Company was at all times an
agent of the United States Steel Corporation, for
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the sole purpose of furnishing iron ore to the
Geneva Works ... "
"and the practical effect of said agreement has
been that it is an operating agreement for the mining of iron ore by Utah Construction and Mining
Company as an agent for United States Steel Corporation."
"That the above entitled court set aside what is
claimed to be a lease agreement between Columbia
Iron Mining Company and Utah Construction &
Mining Company, and designate said instrument to
be nothing but an operation agreement by the terms
of which Utah Construction & Mining Company 18
an agent of United States Steel Corporation to mine,
stockpile and load iron ore on railroad cars at a
stated price per ton." (Emphasis added.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, APPELLANTS ARE LIMITED TO
THE RELIEF PROVIDED FOR BY TITLE 35,
CHAPTER 1, SECTION 60, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 (WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION).
Appellants must fail on their contention that the Re.
spondent is liable under the doctrine of principal and agent
or employer-employee, for the reason that under that theory
they would be limited to the exclusive relief provided for
by Title 35, Chapter 1, Section 60, Utah Code Annotated
(1953). This section is as follows:
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"The right to recover compensaition pursuant
to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained ·
by an employee, whether resulting in death or not
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employe;.
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed bv
this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children ' '
parents, dependent<;, next of kin, heirs, personal'
representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury
or death in any way conneoted, sustained, aggravated because of or anising out of his employment,
and no action at law may be maintained against an
employer . . . based upon any accident, injury m·
death of an employee."
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the exclusiveness of the Workmen's Compensation remedy pro- ,
vided by the statute. In the case of Halling v. Industrial
Com'n. 71 Utah 112, 263 Pac. 78 ( 1927), the Court construed an eady Utah Workmen's Compensation Law which
was "·orded similar to the language in the present Code.
The earlier law provided that compensation would be the
exclusi\'e remedy with ithe exception, that if the injury was
caused by the employer's wiHful misconduct, a negligence
action could be maintained. In setting out its interpretation of that act, the Court said:
" [Under Utah's law], it is only in the case of ·
an injury caused by the employer's wilrlful misconduct that an injured employee, or, in case the injury
results in death, his dependents, may recover damages in an action at law for a wrongfu'l injury.
When the injury is caused merely by the negligent
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act of the employer, the injured employee, or when
the injury causes death, his dependents,
be
content to accept the compensation provided for in
the act."
Again, in Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining
& Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P. 2d 612, 616 (1948), this
Court interpreted the meaning of a later law which reads
similar to the present statute. The language therein used
was this:
"Many decisions have indicated that the act
operated on the employer-employee relationship,
and that coexistence with the charge was an abrogation of the employee's common law right to sue
t:Jhe employer for any and all injuries suffered while
in the course of his employment, except in those
cases where the employer was not subject to the
act or the common law remedy of the employee was
expressly reserved by the act."
The exclusive remedy rule is not unique to Utah. Many
other jurisdictions have recognized thait Workmen's Compensation is in lieu of any other common law remedy. For
brevity reasons, we cite onily from decisions in two neighboring states. The Nevada Supreme Court in the case of
Las Vegas - Tonopah-Reno State Lines, Inc. v. Nevada Industrial Com'n, 81 Nev. 626, 408 P. 2d 241, (1965) construed Nevada's Workmen's Compensation Law as follows:
"Once it is determined by the commis.sion or by
a court that a covered employee has sustained a
personal injury arising out of and in the course of
his employment, compensation therefor is limited to
that provided by the act." 408 P. 2d at 243.
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In In Re Lockard, 76 Idaho 506, 285 P. 2d 473,
476 (1955), the Idaho Supreme Court has given the Idaho
statute a like construction:
''We have consistently held that the remedy provided by the compensation law is exclusive in all
cases arising out of employment not excepted from
its provisions."
The foregoing discussion could terminate this brief
if it were not for the exception which is provided in Title
35, Chapter 1, Section 62, Utah Code Annotated, which provides:
"When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, the injured employee or in case of death his dependents, may cla:im
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also have an action
for damages against such third person."
Siince compensation bars recovery against the employer, but not against third parties who are not connected
in with the employment, it becomes important to determine
who is an ''employer". The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42 provides the appropriate answer:
" ... Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over
/hose work he retains supervision or control, and
such work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under
\
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him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors shall be deemed, within the meaning of this
section, employees of such original employer."
The same statute then goes on to provide that when
the contractor is an independent contractor, he and not the
original employer is deemed the employer within the meaning of the Act. An independent contractor is then defined
as one who"Is not .subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a
definite job or piece of work, and is subordina;te to
the employer only in effecting a result in accordance
with the empioyer's design."
It is interesting .to note that in this jurisdiction the
same criteria i.s used in determinng both the master and
servant relatonship under the act and the principal-agent
relationship which Appellants cla;im exists between U. S.
Steel and Utah Construction Company. For example, the
Utah Supreme Court said in Thiokol Chemical Corp. v.
Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P. 2d 319 (1964) :
"The line of demarcation between one who operates as an independent contractor as opposed to
one who is the servant or agent of another is sometimes a bit blurred. Thi.s court has on a number of
occasions confronted this problem and set forth various criteria to be considered in making the proper
classification. The most fundamental one relates to
the extended control by tlhe one who hires over the
one who performs the service. If the employer's
will is represented only by a desired result, the indication i.s of an independent contractor; whereas,
if the employer exercises control over the means of

10
accomplishing the result, this points toward an
agent or servant relationship." 15 Utah 2d at 358.
This holding is consistent with that reached by the
Utah Cuurt in Parkinson v. Industrial C01nm'n, 110 Utah
172 P. :2d 136, 109 (1946) which discusses the exact
meaning \Jf the \VOl'kmen'.s Compensation Act and states:
··From these definitions it is apparent that
whether a workman is an 'employee' or an 'inJependent contractor' is dependent on ( 1) whether
the employer has the right to control his execution
of the work, (2) whether the work done or to be
done is a part or process in the trade or busines.s of
the employer, and ( 3) whether the work done or to
be done is a definite job or piece work ... The most
important of the determinatives of the rel3.Jtionship
between W'Ol'kmen and employer 'is that of control."
The Court again used almost precisely the same language in the more recent case of Plewe Const. Co. v. Industrial rom'n. 121 Utah 375, 242 P. 2d 561, 562 (1952):
'' [Even though the relationship of the contractor to the company] 'might be characterized by
some of the elements incident to the relationship of
independent contractors' the test of whether the
company is deemed the employer where the work
is a part or proces.s in its trade or business, is
whether it retains the supervision and control over
the work of the contractor."
The next two cited cases have indicated that where
the relationship is found to be within the meaning of the
Act, the sole remedy of the employee is Workmen's Compensation.
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I11 the ease of Ma»yland Casualty Co. v. Industrial
Co111'n and John F. O'Brien, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020
( 1961), the Supreme Court of Utah had before it a case
im·olvitng- an independent contractor who was performing

wo1·k for Dames and Moore in a drililing operation. The
Industrial Commission had found O'Brien was an employee
covered by compensation, and that was the issue before the
Supreme Court. The important principle announced in that
case is found in the following language:
"There is some dispute in the evidence, but
more so as to the interpretation thereof, as to the
facts bearing upon the relationship Mr. O'Brien
bore to Dames and Moore. The latter, Soil Engineers, were engaged by the Utah Power & Light
Company to do some testing to determine why its
power plant at Castle Dale was sinking. Dames and
Moore engaged Mr. O'Brien and his partner, brother-in-law, James Phizackles, to provide and operate
a cable tool drilling rig and crew for drilling and
sampling the soil strata underlying the power plant.
It is to be conceded that as between the parties, Mr.
O'Brien was not considered as an employee by
Dames and Moore. They did not so carry him on
their books, nor withhold any income tax or social
security for him, nor make any other deductions
from the money paid for his services. Nevertheless,
there is evidence concerning the manner of carrying
out this project which supports the Commission's
finding that Mr. O'Brien should be regarded as an
employee: the payment was to be made by the shift,
rather than for a completed job; Dames and Moore
kept a supervisor, Mr. Donald E. Nelson, on the
job and he was there 95% of the time and perform-
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ing that function; he fixed the length of the shift

to be worked and determined whether they would

work on weekends. He gave directions where to set
up the rig and to dig the hole; how deep they should
dig, when to bail out and clean the hole; when and
where to take samples and when not satisfied to
take a new one; when to stop and when to resume
drilling.
"It is our opinion that thi.s evidence, in the
light of the rules hereinabove discussed, provides a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that Mr. O'Brien
was an employee within the meaning of Sec. 35-142 quoted above, and therefore covered by the Industrial Compensation Act." 12 Utah 2d at 226.

A slight variation in the principles above discussed can
be found in Cook v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d
20, 286 P. 2d 616 (1963), where the Court laid down the
rule that when companies or individuals are united for a
common purpose for their mutual benefits they each may be
held employers and subject to the coverage and protection
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Coker Construction Company had obtained a contract for the construction
of a diver:sfon tunnel at the Flaming Gorge Dam. Coker entered into an agreement with the defendant Kiewit to pool
their efforts in constructing the diversion tunnel, sharing in
the profits and losses as a re.suit. The plaintiff Cook was an
employee of Coker and was injured in the course of his employment. He recovered compensation from Coker and then
commenced a negligence action against Kiewit. There was
little or no evidence that Kiewit in facit had any control over
the actions of Cook as an employee of Coker. The Court,
however , denied Cook's cause of action. The Court placed
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the emphasis not upon any element of control, but upon
the fact that both companies were united in a common purpose or goal.
"Being so united for a common purpose for
mutual profit, these companies became partners in
a venture just the same as if two individuals had
entered into it, and whatever one company and its
employees did in furthering the project would enure
to the benefit of the other. Accordingly, it would
seem that Coker's act in paying premiums for workmen's compensation to protect itself against loss
should also enure to the benefit of Kiewit and vice
versa. It also follows that under such
the partnership entity should be regarded as tht!
employing unit; and the employees of both companies as engaged in the same employment." 15
Utah 2d at 23.
The Court then wenrt on to point out that a recovery
in such a .situation would be in effect an unjust windfall to
the employee or his dependents.
"Another facet of the situation which should
not be overlooked is that to permit the employee to
sue the defendant Kiewit under these circumstances,
where it is part of the employing unit, would not
be in conformity 1with the design of the Act. insofar
as the employee is concerned. It is obviously intended that in consideration of the certainty of compensation the Act affords him, he should forego the
right to sue the employer for injury. Sanctioning
this action will allow him in effect to 'have his cake
and eat it too' by getting the certain Workmen"s
Compensation and also the right to sue the employing unit for anorther and possibly greater recovery
for his injury." 15 Utah 2d at 24.
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In concluding this facet of the brief, we reemphasize
that Appellants have alleged facts and conclusions which
bring them within the sweep of the foregoing authorities.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO
DECEASED TO MAINTAIN UTAH'S PREMISES IN A SAFE CONDITION OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, IF THEY WERE DANGEROUS, TO \VARN HIM OF THEIR CONDITION.
The second legal basis which appears possibly raised
by the Appellants' Amended Compaint is that the Respondent owed some duty to the deceased to keep Utah's premises safe; or in the alternative, to make regular inspections
and if unsafe conditions were observed, to notify deceased
of the danger.
For the purpose of argument, Respondent will take the
position that the decedent may have been a business visitor
for a limited purpose. However, that is just the beginning
of the proposition and not the end. Conceding the relationship, it existed only as to Utah, and not as to Respondent.
The deceased was an employee of Utah and the relationship
of employer and employee existed. That would entitle deceased to a reasonable assurance by Utah as his employer
that he \\·as working under safe conditions, but it would
not saddle any obligation on the Respondent. Implicit in the
theory that premises must be kept reasonably safe for a
business visitor is the proposition that the person responsible for the dangerous condition must own, lease or control
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tiw prPmises and have the authority to extend an invitation

to t!le party injured for the purposes for which the visit is
being made. In the instant case, the deceased at the time
oi' his injury was on Utah's land at Utah's invitation. Certhe Respondent did not have the right to hold out any
im·itation to him to go on his employer's land; nor is it
asserted that it did so directly or indirectly. Protection
aL'orclecl by the status of invitee can be created only by the
owner of the land or one charged with the responsibility of
maintaining the premises for those rightfully thereon, and
here the Respondent is not in the class of an invitor.
There are no allegations that Respondent had any
authority to determine when and where the deceased would
work, the area where ore would be dumped, the position on
the dump where the load would be dropped, and the area
from which the ore would be removed each day, or to direct
the movement of Utah's vehicles. While it is alleged that
Respondent had engineers somewhere in Southern Utah, it
is not averred that they were employed on the property inrnh·ecl and neither is it alleged that they performed any
duties for Utah. There are no facts stated which show they
had any reason or duty to travel to Utah's land and there
to inspect that corporation's premises, and direct it to take
any action to render the premises safe. There is no allegation that they had any right or power to interfere with the
directions Utah gave its employees to operate in any specific manner or to work in specific places. In the absence
of averments showing to the contrary for the Court to
hold otherwise would be to take management and control
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away from the officers, directors and managers of Utah
and place those responsibilities on Respondent.
Finally, in regards to this aspect of the case, Appellants do allege that Respondent owned the ore which was
stored on L()lw Grade Dump #8, and for the purposes of
this appeal we must assume that to be the case. However,
that does not establish that the owner is liable for any injuries arising out of its storage. Surely irt follows as a
matter of law that when the ore no longer was a part of
the land, it became personal property, and when it was
hauled beyond the boundaries of Respondent's claim, Utah
was solely responsible for the manner in which it was
handled.
These are the relevant aHegations in the Complaint
wihich bring the last proposition into issue :
". . . United States Steel Corporation became the
t:me owner of ,the Little AJ!lie mining claim from
which said ore was being hauled and the other
claims identified herein and was the owner of the
ore in the stockpile known as Low Grade Stockpile
#8." (Emphasis added.)
And
"Said agreement allowed Utah Construction Company to stockpile ore and to turn it to the United
States Steel Corporation, defendant, at a later date,
and as a matter of practice, said Utah Construction
Mining Company would place the ore in stockpiles
in which the ownership and identity of the same are
maintained, until .said ore was shipped and used."
(Emphasis added.)
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It is significant to note that there is no allegation that
Respondent owned the land where Low Grade Stockpile #8
was located; the reason for that omission is that it was
owned
Utah. Fairly construing the language in the last
quotations in favor of Appellants, it raises a P<>SBible issue
involving the duties and obligations of a bailor of property
to a third party who has been injured by the negligence of
the baile€. We, therefore, look to the law of negligence
growing out of that status.
A bailor of property is not chargeable with the negligence of a bailee. Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P.
2d 437 (1948), Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed, 1 Utah 2d 308,
265 P. 2d 1013 ( 1954). The rule enunciated in the abovecited case is further enunciated in Bailments, 8 Am. Jur.
2d § 259 at 1144:
"The relationship of bailor and bailee is not, as
such, within the doctrine of respondeat superior;
the general ru1e at common law, both in bailment
for gratuitous use and in lettings for hire, is that
the bailor cannot be held responsible to a third person for injuries resulting from his bailee's negligent
use of the bailed property in the absence of any control exercised by the bailor at the time or of negligence of his own which proximately contributed to
the injuries. Such a liability could only be sustained
on the theory that a bailor stands in the relation of
principal or master to the bailee."
1

Perhaps a short hypothetical situation based on facts
different from those alleged in this case will suffice to show
that if Appellants are relying on ownership of the ore as
placing a duty on Respondent, their trust is bottomed on a
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broken reed. If an owner turns over hi.s household furniture to a \'an and storage company to be later returned to
him. it is improperly stored, and an employee of the company is injured because of the negligent storage, we suggest
that the bailor of the property is not liable.
It would indeed be a great departure from the rule of
any known C::lSe to have this Court burden an O\vner of
inert personal property piled on a third party's real property with a responsibility to regularly inspect and reasse6s
the possibility of third parties being injured by the manner
of storage. While it is true an owner of real property is
charged with the duty to keep his land reasonably safe for
invitees, that rule cannot be extended to cases of bailees
and bailors. Common sense dictates that the duties of a
bailor should not be expanded to require constant vigilance
over perwnal property and to make certain it is handled
and stored in such a way that injury will not result to third
parties. Personal property is transitory and an owner could
not reasonably follow it from place to place. Here the
bailee and the possessor was Utah, and it alone would be
responsible for the death of the decedent. To hold otherwise would overturn a long and well established line of
authorities.
Very little need be said about the authorities cited by
Appellants for the reason that if they are material, they
support Respondent. For example, in Rogalski v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 ( 1954), the defendant maintained a platform for use in cleaning its trucks.
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Plaintiff stumbled into a vat of caustic soda which was only
two inches from the platform. Defendant had acquiesced in
the use of the steam-cleaning equipment. Plaintiff claimed
he was a business visitor and Defendant answered that he
was a trespasser. The jury found for the Plaintiff, and this
holding placed responsibility on the Defendant because by
acquiescing in the use of its premises, it invited the injured
party to use its facilities. That rule, if it rould be applied
in this case, would place the blame on Utah and not on the
Respondent, for any acquiescence here was by Utah.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the Complaint
herein as amended does not state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and the decision of the Court below dismissing the case was correct.
RespectfuJlly submitted,
CALVIN A. BEHLE
GEORGE W. LATIMER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

